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Technological progress is leading to proliferation and diversification of trading venues, thus in-
creasing the relevance of the long-standing question of market fragmentation versus consolidation.
To address this issue quantitatively, we analyse systems of adaptive traders that choose where to
trade based on their previous experience. We demonstrate that only based on aggregate parameters
about trading venues, such as the demand to supply ratio, we can assess whether a population of
traders will prefer fragmentation or specialization towards a single venue. We investigate what con-
ditions lead to market fragmentation for populations with a long memory and analyse the stability
and other properties of both fragmented and consolidated steady states. Finally we investigate the
dynamics of populations with finite memory; when this memory is long the true long-time steady
states are consolidated but fragmented states are strongly metastable, dominating the behaviour
out to long times.
I. INTRODUCTION
Whether a consolidated or a fragmented market is
more beneficial to a population of traders is a long-
standing debate [1–6]. In a consolidated or concentrated
market, the majority of trades occurs in one (or a few)
as opposed to numerous trading venues. With techno-
logical advances we have seen a proliferation of trading
venues such as online marketplaces. Even more recently
alternative or dark trading venues have appeared, e.g.
dark pools. These are popular not least for their lack of
transparency, which makes them interesting for trading
large quantities of shares without strongly influencing the
price, see e.g. [6, 7].
The emergence of collective behaviour in systems of
autonomous agents is a research topic that has seen
widespread interest among physicists in the last couple
of decades. The main reason for this is the recognition
that statistical physics techniques, which contributed to
the understanding of macroscopic phenomena arising in
large systems of interacting microscopic entities, can be
applied to a range of biological, economic and social sys-
tems. A large body of work exists in the physics litera-
ture on collective effects in socio-economic systems [8, 9],
e.g. mass movement of people [10, 11], herd behaviour
of traders [12], voting patterns [13, 14] etc. One of the
most prominent examples is the minority game, which
continues to attract interest due to its simplicity and its
ability to reproduce at least “stylized” facts about finan-
cial markets [15, 16]; extensions of the model also predict
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interesting grouping phenomena when multiple assets are
available to agents [17]. In a similar vein, in this paper,
we investigate whether fragmentation and consolidation
can arise solely as a consequence of interactions at the
level of the agents, combined with individual adaptation.
Some studies of stylized models of market competi-
tions already exist, often pointing out the emergence of
monopolies whereby the majority of trades occurs in one
trading venue. Pagano [18] argues that when markets
are identical (in terms of their transaction costs), risk
averse traders will concentrate in a single market. On
the other hand, when there is asymmetry, fragmenta-
tion might arise with traders being clustered based on
the sizes of their desired transactions. Chowdhry and
Nanda [2] reach the same conclusion in a system with
asymmetrically informed traders and a general number
of markets.
Ellison et al. [19] and Shi et al. [20] also study com-
petition among markets and the conditions under which
such competition can lead either to monopolies or to co-
existence of multiple markets. The authors name two
significant effects in a competition of double auction trad-
ing venues. One of them is the positive size effect, i.e.
agents prefer to trade in a market where there are already
many traders of the opposite type. As an example, sell-
ers like trading at markets where there are many buyers
as this gives them a wider choice of offers. The authors
of Refs. [19, 20] also suggest the existence of a negative
size effect in a double auction market: agents will prefer
being in the minority group of traders more often, with
e.g. buyers benefiting from trading at a market where
there are not many other buyers, see e.g. [21]). Ellison
et al. [19] point out that such negative size effects can
enable the coexistence of many markets. On the other
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2hand Shi et al. [20] investigate which of the two effects
is stronger and find that due to more substantial posi-
tive effects, a monopoly will be the favoured end-state
in many situations. The authors of [20] argue that mar-
ket coexistence remains a possibility when there is strong
market differentiation, especially for markets that have
different pricing policies: one market might charge a fixed
participation fee while another might take a profit fee. A
common feature of the studies mentioned above is that
some form of Nash equilibrium analysis was used, assum-
ing perfect information about the activity of all traders
and maximisation of an underlying utility function for
the agents.
The increased proportion of trades that take place in
dark trading venues – 15% of the US share market volume
was traded in dark pools in 2013 [22] – suggests increased
fragmentation at least between traditional and dark trad-
ing. Calling for more research on reasons behind market
fragmentation, Gomber et al. [23] suggest the heterogene-
ity of traders and their needs as one of the main drivers
of market fragmentation. However, studies of similar ef-
fects such as the emergence of market loyalty in fish mar-
kets [24], herding [12] and grouping of agents in multi-
resource minority games [17] show that fragmentation-
like phenomena may also be emergent. Nonetheless, ex-
isting models for such emergent fragmentation often as-
sume a considerable amount of structure, e.g. in the con-
nectivity among agents, the information available about
the actions of other players, the rules of interaction via
the market mechanism, the asymmetry between buyers
and sellers, etc. In contrast, we study here a model in
which initially homogeneous agents adapt only to their
private information, and show that even in such a system
both market fragmentation and consolidation can occur
depending on global system parameters.
Based on observations from the CAT tournament [25],
where the spontaneous emergence of long-lived market
loyalties was seen in complicated systems of adaptive
markets and traders, we hypothesize that the reason for
fragmentation may not lie in the intricacies of different
market mechanisms or trading strategies. Instead, we
conjecture that fragmentation is a collective phenomenon
arising as a consequence of the continuous adaptation
of the individual agents to an evolving system. To test
this hypothesis, we developed a stylised model of double
auctions and adaptive traders [26, 27] that does indeed
predict emergent fragmentation under minimal assump-
tions on the complexity of market and trading mecha-
nisms. The model also shows market consolidation un-
der some circumstances. Our focus in this study is to pin
down under what conditions fragmentation and consol-
idation occur, and what relative benefits they bring for
the tradners. As we will see the behaviour of the model
is remarkably rich in spite of its simplicity, with mul-
tiple steady states coexisting in the limit of long agent
memory. For finite memory length, this can lead to the
existence of long-lived metastable states that dominate
before the true steady state is reached eventually.
We start with a short description of the model [27] in
section II and then proceed to the large memory limit
analysis of small systems with N = 2 and 4 agents in
section III. These can be thought of as two- and four-
player games. They are convenient as we can easily track
each trader’s adaptation. At the same time they already
reveal qualitative phenomena related to those we find
later in large systems, in particular coordination at the
same market (for N = 2) and onset of fragmentation via
pairwise coordination (for N = 4). Moving on to the
large population limit (N → ∞), we then first analyse
a population with homogeneous buying preferences IV A.
We develop the relevant mathematical framework and
techniques of analysis here and then generalise the results
to systems with separate buyer and seller agent types.
Finally we study the system dynamics in some detail to
go beyond the steady state analysis in section V.
Overall we follow a typical statistical physics philoso-
phy in using a model that reduces the underlying market
choice dynamics to its key ingredients, allowing us to ob-
tain detailed insights into the origins of the resulting col-
lective behaviour. The analysis also relies significantly
on statistical physics concepts and methods: we focus
mostly on the thermodynamic limit of large agent pop-
ulations, where we exploit the fact that the behaviour
of N interacting agents for N → ∞ can be captured by
the dynamics of a single agent subject to self-consistently
determined population-level order parameters. The main
outcome from this physical point of view is the emergence
of multiple non-trivial steady states in the large interact-
ing non-equilibrium systems that we study.
II. MODEL
Here we summarize basic assumptions and properties
of the model introduced in [26, 27], which is the founda-
tion for the analysis in this paper.
Learning. In the model, agents choose among the
available markets once in every trading period and sub-
mit their order to the chosen market. A key assumption is
that agents base their decision of where to trade on their
previous experience at the different markets. Agents rely
on the following reinforcement rule, which is based on
the experience-weighted attraction rule [28, 29] but ne-
glects knowledge about the other markets (via so-called
fictitious payoffs):
Aim(n+1) =
{
(1− r)Aim(n) + rSim(n), m chosen in round n
(1− r)Aim(n), otherwise
(1)
Here Aim(n + 1) is agent i’s attraction to market m at
trading period n+1 given his/her score or return, Sim(n),
obtained in the previous trading period (see below) and
the previous attraction Aim(n). To understand the role
of r one can write down the resulting general expression
3for the attraction at trading round n:
Aim(n) =
n−1∑
j=0
r(1− r)n−jδmi(j),mSim(j)
+ (1− r)nAim(0)
where the Kronecker δ restricts updates to rounds where
the agent’s chosen market mi(j) is the one (m) being
considered. The factor r(1− r)n−j in this expression is a
weight that decays exponentially into the past, becoming
small once n − j is of order 1/r. Thus each agent effec-
tively averages scores over a sliding window into the past
of length ≈ 1/r, so that 1/r can be thought of as setting
the length of the agents’ memory.
To choose a market at each trading round, an agent
translates the learned attractions into probabilities of
choosing each markets, using the multinomial logit or
softmax function:
P im(n) =
exp(βAim(n))∑
m′ exp(βA
i
m′(n))
(2)
This aspect of the model is also in line with the
experience-weighted attraction literature [28, 29]; β is
the intensity of choice and regulates how strongly the
agents bias their preferences towards actions with high
attractions. For β → ∞ the agents choose the option
with the highest attraction, while for β → 0 they choose
randomly and with equal probabilities among all options.
We study agents whose choice of the type of trading
order (to buy or to sell) is not adaptive but rather set by
a fixed buying preferences piB. This assumption simplifies
the analysis while still allowing both consolidation and
fragmentation behaviour as shown previously [27].
Trading strategies. Agents do not have sophisti-
cated trading strategies in our model and are essentially
zero-intelligence traders [30–32]. Their orders to buy
(bid) or sell (ask) a single unit of the underlying good
at a certain price are independent of previous returns or
other information. We assume specifically that bids, b,
and asks, a, are normally distributed as a ∼ N (µa, σ2a)
and b ∼ N (µb, σ2b ), where we fix µb > µa as in [27]. After
each round of trading each agent receives a score, reflect-
ing their payoff in the trade. This depends on the global
trading price set by a chosen market m as well as the
order the agent has submitted. The scores of agents who
do trade are assigned as in previous studies [30, 33]: buy-
ers value paying less than they offered (b), and so their
score is S = b − pi. Sellers value trading for more than
their ask (a), and so S = pi− a is a reasonable model for
their payoff; in both cases pi is the trading price.
Market mechanism. In the spirit of keeping the
model as simple as possible we consider double auction
markets in discrete time, counted as before in trading
rounds. In every round the global trading price is set by
the market: once all orders have arrived, these are used
to determine the average bid 〈b〉 and average ask 〈a〉 and
set the price:
pi = 〈a〉+ θ(〈b〉 − 〈a〉) (3)
where θ fixes the price closer to the average bid (θ > 0.5)
or the average ask (θ < 0.5), as in [26]. This parameter
thus represents the bias of the market towards buyers or
sellers. Once the trading price has been set, all bids below
this price, and all asks above it, are marked as invalid
orders as they cannot be executed at the current trading
price. The remaining orders are executed by randomly
pairing buyers and sellers. Excess buyers or sellers, i.e.
those that cannot be paired, receive zero score, as do the
agents who submitted invalid orders.
Note that traders are not informed about the market
biases, nor the market mechanism in general. The only
information they have at their disposal in order to adapt
their market preferences is their personal score.
III. FINITE N
A. Two traders: coordination
To understand collective effects in trading systems, we
first build up some intuition by looking at a very simple
model with only one buyer and one seller. The traders
have a choice between two markets with different biases.
As the system consists of only two agents and two mar-
kets, fragmentation (or segregation as introduced previ-
ously [27]), in which a population will split into distinc-
tive groups favouring one option, is not feasible. How-
ever, we can investigate if long lasting loyalty to a single
market emerges, which can signal market consolidation.
To make trading possible the two agents effectively
need to coordinate, i.e. to submit orders to the same mar-
ket. This can lead to one of the agents earning less than
they could have done at the other market. One ques-
tion of interest concerns the conditions under which the
agents prefer random decisions of who will be a winner
or loser in this manner, as opposed to settling in these
roles over longer periods of time. Thus we will focus
on the existence of coordination of traders and investi-
gate for which parameter settings agents develop strong
preferences for the same market. Intriguingly, this two
player analysis ends up being largely similar to the work
by Hanaki et al. [34] where a two-agent case was like-
wise studied as a first step to understanding collective
effects. (In [34] these concerned specialization behaviour
of agents searching for parking spots.)
For the N = 2 analysis it is convenient to label the two
players as i = ±1 and similarly for the two markets. We
use the following specific parameter settings:
• Of the two players, player i = 1 always buys while
player i = −1 always sells (p1B = 1, p−1B = 0).
• Bids/asks are deterministic, i.e. b ∼ N (µb, 0), a ∼
N (µa, 0), with their difference being fixed to µb −
µa = 1.
• The trading price at each market is set as defined
in [26], pim = 〈a〉+ θm(〈b〉 − 〈a〉).
4• We assume that the market biases are symmetric:
(θ1, θ−1) = (θ, 1− θ) where θ ∈ [0, 0.5].
The simplification over our previous work [26, 27] of mak-
ing bids and asks deterministic allows us to focus solely
on the coordination of the market choices and does not
change the behaviour of the system qualitatively. The de-
terminstic order prices then also make the trading prices
deterministic: pim = µa + θm(µb − µa) = µa + θm.
We can summarize the attraction update rule 1 as
Aim(n+ 1) = (1− r)Aim(n) + rSim(n) ,
with the convention that Sim(n) = 0 if market m was
not chosen by agent i in round n. This generalized score
is fully determined by the market choice of the opposite
player:
Sim(n) = δmi(n),mδm−i(n),mΣ
i
m , (4)
where m(−)i(n) denotes the market of choice of the
(co)player (−)i during trade n and
Σim =
{
µb − pim = 1− θm, i = 1
pim − µa = θm, i = −1 (5)
encodes the relevant nonzero score values that depend on
the type of market and agent. The logit assignment (2)
by which agents choose a market m simplifies for N = 2
to
P im(n) =
1
1 + exp (−βm∆i(n)) = σβ(m∆
i(n)) ,
where σβ(z) = [1 + exp(−βz)]−1 is the logistic sigmoid.
The choice probabilities do not depend on the attrac-
tions to the two markets individually but only on their
difference ∆i = Ai1 −Ai−1. The latter is updated as
∆i(n+ 1) = Ai1(n+ 1)−Ai−1(n+ 1)
= rSi1(n) + (1− r)Ai1(n)
− [rSi−1(n) + (1− r)Ai−1(n)] .
The stochastic variable ∆i(n + 1) thus depends on the
choices the agents make in trading round n, mi(n) and
m−i(n), which are drawn from distributions that depends
on ∆i(n) and ∆−i(n). This situation simplifies in the
long memory limit r → 0, where the attraction differ-
ences change sufficiently slowly to average out stochastic
fluctuations. One can then effectively replace δmi(n),1 by
its expected value σβ
(
∆i(n)
)
(and similarly for −i and
other market choices) in the score (4). This gives
∆i(n+ 1) = r
[
σβ
(
∆i(n)
)
σβ
(
∆−i(n)
)
Σi1
− σβ
(−∆i(n))σβ (−∆−i(n))Σi−1]+ (1− r)∆i(n) ,
which can be further simplified into:
∆i(n+ 1)−∆i(n)
r
= −∆i(n) +
[
σβ
(
∆i(n)
)
σβ
(
∆−i(n)
)
Σi1
− σβ
(−∆i(n))σβ (−∆−i(n))Σi−1] .
The finite difference on the l.h.s. becomes a derivative
in the limit of small r if we switch to the rescaled time
t = nr, for which a unit time interval corresponds to 1/r
trading periods:
∂t∆
i(t) =−∆i(t) +
[
σβ
(
∆i(t)
)
σβ
(
∆−i(t)
)
Σi1
− σβ
(−∆i(t))σβ (−∆−i(t))Σi−1] .
A convenient change in variables that simplifies this
pair of differential equations is ∆1(t) = ξ(t) + ρ(t) and
∆−1(t) = ξ(t) − ρ(t), which after some algebra and ex-
ploiting the market symmetry gives
∂tξ(t) = −ξ(t) + 1
2
sinh (βξ(t))
cosh (βξ(t)) + cosh (βρ(t))
, (6)
∂tρ(t) = −ρ(t) + 1− 2θ
2
cosh (βξ(t))
cosh (βξ(t)) + cosh (βρ(t))
.
Note that ξ = (∆1 + ∆−1)/2 describes the average of
the attraction differences of the two agents, while ρ =
(∆1 −∆−1)/2 captures the deviation between them.
To understand the dynamics we first consider its fixed
points, which need to satisfy
ξ∗ =
1
2
sinh (βξ∗)
cosh (βξ∗) + cosh (βρ∗)
, (7)
ρ∗ =
1− 2θ
2
cosh (βξ∗)
cosh (βξ∗) + cosh (βρ∗)
.
The first of these equations is always satisfied if ξ∗ = 0,
and in that case the equation for ρ∗ has a unique solution
whose sign depends on the sign of 1− 2θ. When market
1 is favourable towards buyers (θ < 0.5), ρ∗ will be pos-
itive. As ∆±1 = ±ρ∗, this can be interpreted as a state
where buyers and sellers learn which market is good for
them, and thus have preferences for opposite markets.
(∆1 is positive meaning that player 1, the buyer, prefers
market 1, which is good for buyers.) As we shall see
shortly this solution is only stable for low intensities of
choice where the agents’ market choice dynamics remains
largely random. The intuition for the appearance of an
instability with increasing β is that, if agents were to fol-
low through fully on their attractions towards opposite
markets, they would never get to trade.
The stability of the solution (ξ∗ = 0, ρ∗) can be studied
by linearizing the dynamical equations (6), resulting in
the stability criterion
β
2
1
1 + cosh(βρ∗)
≤ 1 .
5Expressed in the original variables ∆i, the solution with
∆1∗ + ∆−1∗ = 0 is stable as long as
β
2
1
1 + cosh(β(∆1∗ −∆−1∗)/2) ≤ 1 . (8)
This stability condition is exactly the same as in Ref. [34]
because the learning dynamics we follow is essentially the
same and differs only in the details of the deterministic
returns.
We illustrate in Figure 1 that for low intensities of
choice, where the stability criterion (8) is satisfied, the
fixed point discussed so far is the only one. At higher β
the criterion is violated and two new stable fixed points
appear. Here the agents’ attraction differences are of
the same sign, i.e. they prefer going to the same market.
This happens even though market 1 favours buyers while
market −1 favours sellers.
Figure 1. Two-trader dynamics: flow diagrams (6) for (a) the
intensity of choice β = 2, with a unique fixed point where
agents decide largely randomly, and (b) β = 6, with two new
fixed points indicating where coordinated states appear. For
the market bias used, θ = 0.3, the critical intensity of choice
where coordinated states emerge is βc = 4.16.
At first sight it may seem puzzling that for high in-
tensity of choice, one of the agents decides to settle
for less in persistently choosing the market where (s)he
will be awarded lower scores. However, this pattern
of behaviour in fact maximizes the number of trades
that take place. In the low-β regime, all four pairings
of market choices are equally probable: (m1,m−1) ∈
{(1, 1), (1,−1), (−1, 1), (−1,−1)} but only the first and
the last enable trading. On the other hand, in the high
β regime, when both agents persistently choose the same
market, they always get to trade, although one of the
traders always receives a lower return. For the mar-
ket parameters used in Fig. 1, (θ1, θ−1) = (0.3, 0.7), the
agent who settles for a lower score then receives a score
of 0.3, while the other one obtains 0.7. This has to be
compared to the average payoff at low β, which by aver-
aging over the four market choice pairings is seen to be
1
4 (θ1 + θ−1) =
1
4 . Hence both agents clearly earn more in
the coordinated regime than by choosing randomly.
We can find the domain of parameters θ and β where
the agents will coordinate (Figure 2 (a)) by starting from
the regime of agents choosing largely randomly and track-
ing where the stability condition (8) is first violated as β
is increased. As in the case of large populations [27], we
observe that βc increases with increased market differ-
ence or bias. The symmetry breaking between markets
that coordination requires is therefore not driven by the
difference between the markets. In fact the coordination
threshold is lowest for a system with two identical mar-
kets (θ = 0.5). One can rationalize this by saying that
the agents are happiest to coordinate at one of the mar-
kets in this limit as neither needs to settle for less. We
show average returns for this setup – a pair of traders
choosing between two unbiased markets – as a function
of β in Figure 2 (b). One observes the expected average
score of 1/4 for low β; as β is increased, the agents effec-
tively realize that coordination at a single market enables
more trades and consequently higher average returns.
Figure 2. Two traders: the (θ, β) phase diagram and returns.
(a) Coordination and indecisiveness regions for different in-
tensity of choice and market biases (β and θ). (b) Returns
for different β in a system with two fair markets θ = 0.5. (c):
Returns for different β for market bias θ = 0.3. At the critical
βc = 4.16, the average return of the two agents in the coor-
dinated state is higher than it would be in the continuation
of the low β fixed point (yellow dashed line), but one of the
agents needs to settle for less.
In the panel (c) of Figure 2 we show analogous results
for the case of two biased markets (θ = 0.3). We plot the
individual agents’ payoffs and their average in the state
where they coordinate at one market, and compare this
to the payoff in the largely random low-β state. As a
reference we also plot the continuation of the latter to
larger β, where it is unstable. It is notable that returns
decrease with β on this branch: the more the agents act
on their preference for opposite markets, the less often
they manage to meet at the same market. This results
in more and more trading rounds where both receive a
return of zero, dragging down average returns.
By contrast, in the coordinated state the average re-
6turn increases with β, i.e. as the agents make more and
more definite choices. Interestingly, Figure 2 (c) shows
that this increase in the average return is accompanied
by a growing difference between the returns of the in-
dividual agents. These payoff differences can occur in
our model because agents are unaware of the opposite
player’s return, making decisions only on the basis of
their own scores. Borrowing terminology from the large
system limit [27] we will call the agent with the higher
return return driven and the other volume driven. It is
notable in Figure 2 (c) that there is a range of β where
the volume driven agent receives an average return that
is lower not only than that of the return oriented agent,
but also than the hypothetical return both agents would
achieve in the (unstable) uncoordinated state; this regime
grows as the markets become more biased.
Intuitively, the return driven player develops a strong
preference for the market where (s)he can earn more. The
other agent will occasionally try the other market, but
typically not get to trade there. As this results in a zero
return, (s)he is better off persisting with the coordinated
choice, which offers a low but at least nonzero return.
The two agent systems studied so far can be mapped to
two player games: the symmetric pure coordination game
when the markets are unbiased, and the battle of the sexes
when markets are symmetrically biased. For these games
it is known that the two coordinated states correspond
to pure Nash equilibria, see e.g. [35]. In the symmet-
ric pure coordination game, both of these are envy free
(i.e. both agents earn the same), but not so in the bat-
tle of the sexes – this is consistent with the differences
we saw between unbiased and biased markets, and the
Nash equilibria correspond to the β →∞ limit of the co-
ordinated states. There are also mixed Nash equilibria.
These correspond to the continuation to β → ∞ of our
uncoordinated state for the symmetric pure coordination
game, but not otherwise. A full correspondence to Nash
equilibria could be obtained by modifying the learning
rule so that the attractions to markets that were not
chosen are kept unchanged. This can be interpreted as
“fictitious play” and is discussed in more detail in [36].
The results described above can be generalized to a
pair of traders who do not have strict buyer and seller
roles but instead decide to buy with some probability. We
assume symmetric preferences for buying, p1B = 1−p−1B =
pB. For a trade to occur, agents now need to be at the
same market and need to submit opposite (buy and sell)
orders. As the buying preferences piB are fixed, this only
changes Σim from (5) to
Σim = p
i
B(1− p−iB )(1− θm) + (1− piB)p−iB θm . (9)
To see this, note that agent i receives a buyer payoff
1 − θm when (s)he assumes the role of a buyer (with
prob piB) while the opposite player acts as seller; (s)he
also receives a seller payoff in the opposite configura-
tion. Repeating the calculation above one then finds that
the fixed point conditions (7) both acquire a factor of
p2B + (1 − pB)2 on the r.h.s., while the stability condi-
Figure 3. Two traders: coordination threshold as a function
of θ and pB). Note that the threshold is finite for all system
parameters and increases the more similar the agents become,
i.e., as pB decreases towards 0.5.
tion (8) is multiplied by the same factor. Figure 3 shows
contours of the resulting critical βc for coordination. We
note that the coordination threshold increases as pB ap-
proaches 1/2: agents without strong buy/sell preferences
need higher intensities of choice to benefit from the coor-
dinated state. This makes sense because agents with pB
closer to 1/2 derive a lower benefit from coordinating at
a market: as they need to assume buyer and seller roles,
trades at the same market happen only with some prob-
ability, specifically p2B + (1 − pB)2 in our setting, which
approaches one half for pB → 1/2.
B. Four traders: onset of fragmentation
The two player system studied above already exhib-
ited an interesting collective phenomenon – coordination
at a market to enable more trades, sometimes even to the
detriment of an individual agent. Turning to fragmenta-
tion, where otherwise homogeneous agents nonetheless
learn to adopt different policies, the minimal system size
where we can expect a similar effect is N = 4. We
first study two identical buyers and two identical sellers,
choosing agents with deterministic buy/sell behaviour
(piB = 0 or 1) for simplicity. A system with four agents
is small enough so that we can still easily write down de-
terministic equations for the evolution of market attrac-
tions, but large enough for the first signals of fragmented
states to appear as agents can split across the markets in
pairs. We consider again symmetrically biased markets,
θ1 = 1−θ−1 = θ. As before, the market choice behaviour
of each agent is determined by his/her market attraction
difference ∆g,i. Here the index g denotes the agent group
7Figure 4. Four agents (two buyers and two sellers): phase diagram and returns. (a) Phase diagram showing steady states as
a function of intensity of choice β and market bias θ. Coordinated steady states exist to the right of the dark violet, solid
line and fragmented steady states to the right of the pink solid line with markers. (b) Returns against intensity of choice β
for all agents and separately for return and volume driven agents; market biases are (θ1, θ−1) = (0.3, 0.7). Dashed lines show
coordinated states and solid lines fragmented states. The yellow line shows the average return in the uncoordinated steady
state, continued (dashed) into the instability region at high β.
(buyers or sellers) while i labels agents within each group.
For small r the attraction differences again obey deter-
ministic time evolution equations that can be derived by
following the reasoning in the previous subsection. The
only difference lies in the calculation of the return Sg,im (n)
at a chosen market, which now depends on the choices
made by all other players:
Sg,im (n) = δmg,i(n),m{Σgm
2
δmg,−i(n),m
(
δm−g,1(n),m + δm−g,−1(n),m
)
+ Σgm
(
1− δmg,−i(n),m
) (
δm−g,1(n),m
+ δm−g,−1(n),m − δm−g,1(n),mδm−g,−1(n),m
)}
,
In the expression above, Σgm denotes the deterministic
part of the return, which only depends on the chosen
market m and the agent type g, by analogy with the two
player case in Eq. (9). The Kronecker δ-symbols ensure
other agents are present at the same market m. The first
term describes the situation where both agents of the
same type go to a single market m; the return is then
zero if no agents of the opposite type are at the same
market, Σgm if there are two, and Σ
g
m/2 if there is only
one (as our chosen agent then only has probability 1/2
of being allowed to trade). On the other hand, when the
second player of the same type is not at the same market,
the player receives the full return if there is at least one
trader of the opposite group present. This is described by
the second term. The deterministic equations for r → 0
then take the form
∂t∆
g,i(t) = −∆g,i(t) +
1∑
m=−1
mSg,im (t) ,
where Sg,im (t) has the meaning of returns averaged over a
long time window so that the Kronecker deltas in Sg,im (n)
are replaced with their expected values, exactly as in the
derivation for two players. We solve these equations nu-
merically and find that for low and intermediate inten-
sity of choice β the behaviour is analogous to that for
N = 2, showing a transition from a single uncoordi-
nated fixed point to two coordinated fixed points as β
increases; throughout this range the agents within each
group have identical market attractions. The novel fea-
ture of the N = 4 system is that, when β is increased
yet further, four new stable states appear. We call these
fragmented as each group of agents now “fragments” into
two individuals with distinct – and essentially opposite
– market preferences. Both markets are then populated
by a pair of traders, one from each group. The frag-
mented fixed points appear in stable/unstable pairs and
for high enough value of β unstable fragmented fixed
points become partially fragmented, e.g. only one group
splits across the markets, while the other group specialize
for one market. As these fixed points are not stable we
do not show this transition line in Figure 4.
In Figure 4 we show the two critical β lines (the coor-
dination and the fragmentation threshold) as a function
of the market bias θ, for the above scenario of four play-
ers with strict buy/sell roles. The coordination line is
very close to the one for two players, which is included
for comparison. Both the coordination and fragmenta-
8tion lines follow the same trend, with the threshold in β
increasing as θ departs from 0.5.
The right panel of Figure 4 shows return lines for dif-
ferent intensities of choice β: dashed lines correspond to
coordinated states, while solid lines are averages in the
fragmented state. Note that the difference in returns in
the coordinate state is between groups of agents, with all
agents in a group either return driven or volume driven.
In the fragmented states there is one return driven and
one volume driven agent in each group, on the other
hand. We note that in the large β limit the returns
achieved in coordinated and fragmented states become
identical. This is because with either pattern of market
choices, if these choices are made deterministically then
all agents are guaranteed to be able to trade. For finite
β, returns in the coordinated state are generally higher
than for fragmentation.
Note that the four fragmented states arise because in
each agent group there are two ways for assigning the two
agents to the two markets. For N agents, one therefore
expects {(N/2)!/[(N/4)!]2}2 such states. This number
grows very rapidly with N while the number of coordi-
nated states remains at two.
Figure 5. Four traders: phase diagram when buy and sell
roles are probabilistic. Coordination takes place below the
dark violet (solid) line and fragmentation below the pink line
(solid line with circles). These regions shrink when the differ-
ence in the buy and sell preferences of the agents decreases
(pB → 0.5), similarly to the trend in the two player system
(dashed line). Below the orange line “partially fragmented”
fixed points exist, where one of the four agents has a prefer-
ence for the opposite market.
Finally, as in the analysis of the two agent system we
can generalise the results by allowing agents to assume
the role of buyer with some group dependent probabil-
ity p
(g)
B . We again take these probabilities as symmetric
between groups, p1B = 1 − p−1B = pB. The determinis-
tic part Σgm of the agents’ returns is then modified in a
manner directly analogous to Eq. (9), and one can de-
termine the effect on the existence of the various steady
states. Figure 5 shows the results for the symmetric mar-
kets (θ1, θ−1) = (0.3, 0.7) and symmetric groups. As in
the system with only two agents, when the traders’ pref-
erences for buying are similar (pB ≈ 1/2) they have a
weaker incentive to coordinate, resulting in a higher co-
ordination threshold for β (for the sake of clearer visual-
isation we use 1/β on the y-axis). The same behaviour
is seen also for the fragmentation threshold.
We indicate in Figure 5 also the regime where a further
type of fixed point exists: partially fragmented states. In
these states there is a single agent whose market prefer-
ence is the opposite of that of the other three players, so
that only one agent group is fragmented. These states
evolve for high enough β out of unstable fragmented
states, which themselves appear in pairs with the sta-
ble fragmented states at the onset of fragmentation. As
we will see below, partially fragmented states exist in the
large population limit too, though in a limited region of
parameter space. In the small system here they are un-
stable. Intuitively this is likely to be due to the smaller
number of trades: in the large β limit of a partially frag-
mented fixed point, there will be at most one trade per
trading period (only two out of the three agents going to
one market will be able to trade) while both fragmented
and coordinated states lead to two trades.
IV. LARGE POPULATION LIMIT
A. Population with a fixed buying preference
In studying systems with a small number of agents we
have already encountered a rich phenomenology: coor-
dination of agents at a single market, pairwise fragmen-
tation across two markets and even some mixed states
where one group fragments while the other specialises in
trading at a single market. We now complement and gen-
eralise these results by investigating the possible types
of steady state in the large population limit. We start
with a simple setting, a population in which all agents
have identical preferences for buying piB = pB,∀i. The
assumption of population homogeneity is a strong one,
but these traders still undergo fragmentation for a broad
range of parameters, while the system is simpler to anal-
yse. Thus it is a useful prelude to the analysis of a pop-
ulation consisting of two or more groups with distinct
buying preferences.
To describe the steady states of such an initially ho-
mogeneous agent population we follow the distribution
of attraction differences (∆i = Ai1 −Ai2) across the pop-
ulation [27]. The state of each market m enters via the
probability with which buy (B) and sell (S) orders are
executed successfully [27, 37]:
TBm = min
(
1,
QSm
QBmDm
)
TSm = min
(
1,
QBmDm
QSm
)
.
(10)
Here the factors QB,Sm are the probabilities for submit-
ted buy/sell orders to be valid, i.e. on the right side of
9the trading price; the explicit expressions are given in
Appendix A). Note that whereas for small systems we
simplified to deterministic order prices, we return here
to the full model where bids, b, and asks, a, are stochas-
tic and the trading price is calculated as in Eq. 3. (As
explained in Sec. II we choose Gaussian distributions for
bids and asks, a ∼ N (µa, σ2a) and b ∼ N (µb, σ2b ); for nu-
merical evaluations we set µb−µa = 1, σa = σb = 1) The
Dm are demand-to-supply ratios, defined as the number
of buyers over number of sellers at market m. For small
r, the attraction difference distribution evolves according
to a Fokker-Planck equation
∂tP (∆|pB, Tγ) =− ∂∆ [M1(∆|pB, Tγ)P (∆|pB, Tγ)] (11)
+
r
2
∂2∆ [M2(∆|pB, Tγ)P (∆|pB, Tγ)] ,
where the drift M1 and diffusion M2 both depend on the
buying preference of the agents and on the four trading
probabilities Tγ . (We use γ = (τ,m) as the generic label
for a combination of order type τ = B,S and market
choice m.) The drift term is (see Appendix A for details
and for the explicit expression of the return distribution
from which 〈Sγ〉 is calculated)
M1(∆|pB, Tγ)
=
1∑
m=−1
∑
τ∈{B,S}
mpτTτm〈Sτm〉σβ (m∆)−∆ , (12)
where the sum runs over markets m and order types τ
and we use the convention pS = 1− pB. The strength of
the diffusion term is
M2(∆|pB, Tγ) = ∆2+ (13)
1∑
m=−1
∑
τ∈{B,S}
[
pτTτm(〈S2τm〉 − 2m∆〈Sτm〉)
]
σβ (m∆) .
The steady state of the Fokker-Planck equation is (see
e.g. [38]):
P (∆|pB, Tγ) ∝ 1
M2(∆|pB, Tγ) exp
(
−f(∆)
r
)
, (14)
where
f(∆) = −2
∫ ∆
0
d∆′
M1(∆
′|pB, Dm)
M2(∆′|pB, Dm) (15)
plays a role analogous to a free energy in thermodynam-
ics. When f(∆) has a single minimum, P (∆) will ap-
proach a narrow peak at this location for r → 0 and we
have an unfragmented state. Otherwise as many peaks
as there are local minima in f(∆) will appear, corre-
sponding to a fragmented state: each peak represents
a subgroup of agents following a distinct market choice
strategy.
Note that in the Fokker-Planck description, the market
order parameters Dm that determine the trading prob-
abilities Tγ have to be calculated self-consistently from
P (∆) [27, 37]. The same self-consistency condition then
also needs to hold at a steady state. Initially we will treat
the order parameters as fixed exogenously, however. Such
a situation could arise if, for example, our agents are just
a very small fraction of the overall trading cohort, with
the latter fixing the demand-to-supply ratio.
Fragmentation for r → 0
Figure 6. Critical intensities of choice as a function of market
biases for (a) an indecisive population (pB = 0.5) and (b) a
decisive population of buyers (pB = 0.8).
In Figure 6 we show how the treshold value of the inten-
sity of choice depends on the market biases (θ1, θ−1) for
different agent populations, one “indecisive” (pB = 0.5)
and one made up of “decisive” buyers (pB = 0.8); for this
calculation we set the order parameters to their “endoge-
nous” value following the self consistent procedure out-
lined in (19). We see that for every pair of market biases
there is a finite threshold βc above which fragmentation
sets in. When agents are indecisive with regards to buy-
ing and selling, the region where fragmentation occurs is
greatest when markets are identical or symmetrically bi-
ased. For decisive buyers (pB = 0.8), on the other hand,
the fragmentation threshold is lowest when the markets
are identical. Intermediate values of pB provide a smooth
interpolation between these two situations.
To understand more closely the properties of the frag-
mented states, we show in Fig. 7 the steady state dis-
tributions of traders with pB = 0.8 when faced with the
choice between two unbiased or two symmetrically biased
markets. To understand the trend with r, we show the
distributions for two different values of r in each case.
As expected from (14) the peak width decreases as ≈ √r
with decreasing r, but in Figure 7 (b) we see that the rel-
ative peak heights also depend on r. In fact, if the peaks
are located at attraction differences ∆1 and ∆2 then the
peak height ratio can be written as
P (∆1|pB, Tγ)
P (∆2|pB, Tγ)
=
M2(∆2|pB, Tγ)
M2(∆1|pB, Tγ) exp
(
−f(∆2)− f(∆1)
r
)
. (16)
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Figure 7. Steady-state attraction difference distributions of
decisive buyers (pB = 0.8). We compare steady states at
β = 20 for (a) two unbiased markets (θ1, θ−1) = (0.5, 0.5) and
(b) two symmetrically biased markets (θ1, θ−1) = (0.3, 0.7),
for r = 0.1 (dashed dark violet line) and 0.05 (solid pink
line). The distributions are strongly and weakly fragmented,
respectively: on the right, the relative height of the lower peak
decreases as r is reduced.
This ratio can stay finite for r → 0 only when
f(∆1) = f(∆2), (17)
and we call this situation strong (S) fragmentation as it
survives even in the r → 0 limit. This is the situation in
Figure 7 (a). If the free energies at the two peaks are un-
equal, on the other hand, one continues to have two peaks
in P (∆) for any nonzero r but the height of one peak de-
creases (exponentially in 1/r) as r goes to zero. We call
this behaviour, which is illustrated in Fig. 7 (b), weak
(W) fragmentation because the lower peak may become
unobservably small for low r; in the strict limit r → 0, the
distribution P (∆) becomes unimodal again. The strong-
weak distinction as defined applies literally only to this
r → 0 limit; at nonzero r it becomes a crossover between
fragmented states where the emergent subgroups have
roughly even (strong) or very different (weak) sizes. At
the weakly fragmented state most of the trades happen
at a single market (increasingly so as r decreases) we re-
late this state to market consolidation, thus the question
of fragmentation versus consolidation becomes question
of strong versus weak fragmentation in our set up.
Now that we have a method for finding steady states
and classifying them we return to the space of market or-
der parameters and investigate where fragmentation oc-
curs. In Figure 8 we show where weakly (coloured region)
and strongly (solid lines inside these regions) fragmented
states appear, at a fixed intensity of choice β = 8.5. We
compare again indecisive (pB = 0.5) and decisive buyers
(pB = 0.8), for three different market setups. We first
note that the weak fragmentation region encompasses a
very wide range of market conditions (order parameters
Dm) for indecisive buyers, but shrinks significantly when
the agents have stronger preferences for buying. Looking
at the dependence on market setup, an obvious feature
is that for two unbiased markets (shown in (c)), equal
demand-to-supply ratios (D1 = D−1 line) produce strong
fragmentation for both types of agents. This makes sense
as the markets are then identical both in their setup
θ1 = θ−1 and in the prevailing market conditions, making
it easy for groups of agents with opposite market pref-
erences to coexist. For the indecisive agents who will
act as buyers or sellers with equal probability, the same
situation arises when the markets have exactly opposite
demand-to-supply ratios (D1 = 1/D−1) and therefore
still offer them identical average returns.
With increasing market biases (Figure 8, (a) and (b))
the picture obtained for two unbiased markets changes
largely smoothly, though note that for decisive buyers
(top row) the two crossing lines of strong fragmentation
detach into two separate lines ((b) top), with one even-
tually disappearing out of range.
Market order parameters. So far we have looked at
fragmentation behaviour driven by exogenously set mar-
ket conditions (demand-to-supply ratios). We now return
to our model as originally set out, where only the adap-
tive agents we describe trade at the two markets. This
leads to the question: will a population endogenously
create market conditions needed for its fragmentation?
For the case of traders with homogeneous buying
preferences pB this question can be answered relatively
straightforwardly. If the steady state distribution of at-
traction differences is P (∆|pB, Tγ), then the fractions of
the whole population buying and selling at market m are:
NBm = pB
∫
d∆P (∆|pB, Tγ)σβ(m∆) ,
NSm = (1− pB)
∫
d∆P (∆|pB, Tγ)σβ(m∆) . (18)
The demand-to-supply ratio then does not in fact depend
on the market preference distribution
Dm =
NBm
NSm
=
pB
1− pB (19)
and is fully determined by pB . In the space of market
order parameters in Figure 8, this endogenous set of mar-
ket conditions is marked with a black dot. We see that
– at high enough β – the population of indecisive buy-
ers fragments strongly when the markets are unbiased
or symmetrically biased, and one can check that these
results hold independently of the specific market biases
used in the figure. Decisive buyers, on the other hand,
fragment strongly only if the markets are equal (the figure
shows only θ = 0.5 but the statement is true for general
θ). Otherwise weak fragmentation occurs, although – see
Figure 8 (top (c)) – when the markets are very different
at a β above that used in Figure 8.
With these insights it is worth revisiting Fig. 6. It
shows the existence of the fragmentation threshold βc
for all market biases, and we recall that this threshold is
defined as the point where P (∆) first acquires two peaks.
From what we have seen above we now understand that
for most combinations of market biases, the steady state
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Figure 8. Single population: steady-state types in the space of market order parameters (D1, D−1) for β = 8.5. Shown on top
is the population of decisive buyers (pB = 0.8) and on bottom the indecisive population (pB = 0.5) for (a) symmetrically biased
markets (θ1, θ−1) = (0.3, 0.7), (b) one unbiased and one biased market (θ1, θ−1) = (0.5, 0.7), and (c) two unbiased markets
(θ1, θ−1) = (0.5, 0.5). Coloured regions indicate where weakly fragmented states exist (for r → 0). Solid lines inside these
regions indicate strongly fragmented states.
one finds above βc is a weakly fragmented one. The ex-
ceptions are the dark lines in Fig. 6, which indicate equal
(θ1 = θ−1) or symmetrically biased (θ1 = 1 − θ−1) mar-
kets.
V. TWO GROUP POPULATION
So far in our analysis of the large size limit of a homo-
geneous population of traders with buying preference pB,
we showed how for any given pair of market order param-
eters (D1, D−1) we can determine the population steady
state. We identified three possible types of steady states:
unfragmented (U), weakly fragmented (W) and strongly
fragmented (S). We now generalise the investigation to
populations of agents consisting of groups with different
buying preferences. We demonstrate the approach for
the case of two groups of the same size, but the princi-
ples are general and can be extended to larger numbers of
groups or different group sizes. We denote a steady state
of a population consisting of two groups with a pair of
letters (X,X’). Here X,X’ ∈ {U,W,S} indicates the type
of steady state for each group, producing nine different
types of population steady states.
We can now find, in the space of market order param-
eters (D1, D−1), the domains of different state types as
we did in Figure 8. We can use the figure directly to read
off the steady states at β = 8.5 of a population of two
groups with buying preferences (p
(1)
B , p
(2)
B ) = (0.8, 0.5).
For example, when the market order parameters are
(D1, D−1) = (5, 5) (the top right corner of all the dia-
grams), the steady state of the two group-population is
(U,W) when the markets are symmetrically biased or bi-
ased/unbiased (Fig. 8 left and centre) and (S,S) when
both markets are unbiased (right diagrams). This sim-
ple analysis can be extended to any number of groups
because, for market order parameters that are fixed exo-
geneously, the groups are independent.
Our primary interest, however, lies in the case of en-
dogenous market conditions where the agents we model
capture the entire trading population and thus define
their own market order parameters. In this case, we need
to find the steady states self-consistently. We have pre-
viously described a procedure for doing this, for nonzero
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r [27]: starting from some initial market order parame-
ters (D1, D−1) one calculates the steady states and up-
dates (D1, D−1) iteratively, converging eventually to a
self consistent set of order parameters. Here we aim to
get a complete picture of all possible steady states, in-
dependently of initial conditions. To do this, we start
from the update equation for the market order parame-
ters from the iterative approach. These are simply the
definitions of the market order parameters (Eqs. 18,19)
extended to two groups:
D′m =
N
(1)
Bm +N
(2)
Bm
N
(1)
Sm +N
(2)
Sm
=
p
(1)
B
∫
d∆σβ(m∆)P (∆|p(1)B , Tγ) + p(2)B
∫
d∆σβ(m∆)P (∆|p(2)B , Tγ)
(1− p(1)B )
∫
d∆σβ(m∆)P (∆|p(1)B , Tγ) + (1− p(2)B )
∫
d∆σβ(m∆)P (∆|p(2)B , Tγ)
. (20)
We can now define, in the market order parameter space,
the two loci where D′1 = D1 and D
′
−1 = D−1, respec-
tively, meaning that one of the order parameters is al-
ready self-consistent. The intersection of these loci (two
lines, for our case of two markets) then gives us all the
self-consistent sets of market order parameters. To dis-
tinguish weak and strong fragmentation the limit r → 0
ought to be taken. To avoid numerical issues we use
here instead a small nonzero r to determine the attrac-
tion difference distributions P (∆|p(g)B , Tγ) from which the
D′m are calculated. In most of what follows we focus on
symmetric market setups (θ1 = 1 − θ−1) and symmetric
agent buying preferences (p
(1)
B = 1−p(2)B = pB). To avoid
having too many parameters to vary we will fix the mar-
ket biases to the default values (θ1, θ−1)=(0.3,0.7) unless
stated otherwise.
A. Transitions in populations of decisive and
indecisive traders.
As shown in previous sections, the intensity of choice
β is a crucial parameter determining whether the steady
state in a system is fragmented or consolidated. Here
we build upon this analysis by investigating how the na-
ture of steady states changes as β is increased. We start
this section with examples of steady states of a popu-
lation with “decisive” traders (p
(1)
B , p
(2)
B ) = (0.8, 0.2) as
well as one with largely “indecisive” traders (p
(1)
B , p
(2)
B ) =
(0.55, 0.45). We then generalize these results to a full
phase diagram for the r → 0 limit, giving the number
and type of steady states as a function of the intensity of
choice β and the buying preference pB.
1. Decisive traders.
In Figure 9 we show, for a series of different β, the
market order parameter space (D1, D−1) with the weak
fragmentation region and the strong fragmentation line
marked for both groups of a population with (p
(1)
B , p
(2)
B ) =
(0.8, 0.2). The order parameter self-consistency lines are
also shown.
In panel (a) of Figure 9, we show the low β regime (β =
1/0.31), just before the onset of fragmentation. Note that
for this β, the steady states of both groups are unfrag-
mented across the entire range of market order param-
eters shown. The unique intersection of the D′m = Dm
loci identifies a single steady state of type (U,U). Panel
(b) shows a just slightly increased β = 1/0.29 where most
market order parameters settings still give unfragmented
states but there are now three intersections of the self-
consistency loci, giving as many (U,U) steady states. In
the steady state that is a continuation of the low β so-
lution the agents show only mild preferences among the
markets, with buyers slightly preferring the market that
gives higher returns for buyers and similarly for sellers.
The other two unfragmented solutions correspond to co-
ordination at one of the two markets so that overall the
situation is similar to the one we saw for N = 2 and
N = 4.
Increasing β further (Fig. 9(c)) one crosses the thresh-
old (βc ≈ 1/0.28 here) where one of the unfragmented
solutions first fragments – the continuation of the low β
state is now in the strongly fragmented domain of both
groups, while the other two steady states remain unfrag-
mented. Note that since the weak fragmentation regions
surround the strong fragemtation lines for both agent
groups, there must in fact be a narrow range of slightly
lower β-values where the fragmentation is weak: the low-
β solution must change from (U,U) through (W,W) to
(S,S) as β increases.
In Fig. 9(d,e) one observes that with increasing β the
fragmentation regions keep growing. This results in the
two unfragmented (U,U) solutions changing first into
(U,W) and finally (W,W).
We note that inferences about stability from diagrams
like Fig. 9 are in general unwarranted; e.g. the initial
pitchfork bifurcation from one to three (U,U) states in
Fig. 9(a,b) does not necessarily imply that the middle
solution is unstable. It would be unstable under repeated
updating from Dm to D
′
m. However, Eq. (20) shows
that this is not the real dynamics but would correspond
to a scenario where the dynamics of the order param-
eters is slowed down artificially so that agents always
have time to equilibrate their attraction difference dis-
tributions P (∆|p(g)B , Tγ) to the current order parameter
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Figure 9. Steady states of traders with decisive buy and sell preferences: order parameter diagrams. For a two-group system
with (p
(1)
B , p
(2)
B ) = (0.8, 0.2), each diagram shows the order parameter self-consistency lines (dashed black) and for each group the
weak fragmentation region and the strong fragmentation line; r = 0.001 throughout. (a) Single (U,U) solution with β = 1/0.31,
(b) three (U,U) solutions with β = 1/0.29, (c) one (S,S) and two (U,U) solutions with β = 1/0.265, (d) (U,W), (S,S) and (W,U)
solutions with β = 1/0.245 and (e) (W,W), (S,S), and (W,W) solutions with β = 1/0.2. We use the following abbreviations for
the steady state of each group: U, unfragmented; W, weakly fragmented; and S, strongly fragmented.
values.
We highlight one further feature of Fig. 9: for small r as
used in the figure, the order parameter self-consistency
lines tend to follow segments of the strong segregation
lines before emerging on either side into a weak segrega-
tion region. This can be understood by noting that the
self-consistency line for e.g. D1 is the zero contour of the
function D′1(D1, D−1)−D1 in the order parameter plane.
This function varies steeply as a strong segregation line
is crossed, developing discontinuities that look like cliff
edges for r → 0. A contour line that hits such a cliff
must follow the line of the cliff before returning to the
smooth parts of the landscape, which is the effect we see
in Fig. 9.
The cliff edges themselves arise because on a segrega-
tion line, the free energy function f(∆) in Eq. (16) has
two minima of equal height. A small change of O(r) in
D1 or D−1 will cause similar small changes in the height
of these minima, but from Eq. (16) this is enough to
cause the weight ratio between the two peaks in P (∆)
to shift by a factor of order unity. Changes larger than
this will transfer all weight from one peak to the other,
and correspondingly modify D′1 by a finite amount. For
r → 0 the required order parameter changes become in-
finitesimal, leading to the cliff edge structure of D′1−D1
and analogously D′−1 −D−1.
2. Indecisive traders.
We now compare the results above with those for
a population consisting of two agent groups with only
weak preferences for buying and selling, (p
(1)
B , p
(2)
B ) =
(0.55, 0.45). The motivation for this comes from the fact
that agents with only mild buy/sell preferences should
develop weaker preferences for markets that offer higher
returns for buyers or sellers. They will also not be penal-
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Figure 10. Steady states of largely indecisive traders: order parameter diagrams. We show the behaviour of largely indecisive
traders (p
(1)
B , p
(2)
B ) = (0.55, 0.45) for different intensities of choice β in the large memory limit, evaluated numerically for
r = 0.00001: (a) β = 1/0.31, one unfragmented solution (U,U); (b) β = 1/0.285, one weakly fragmented (W,W) and four
partially fragmented (U,S) states; (c) β = 1/0.27 one weakly (W,W) and four partially fragmented (W,S) states; (d) β = 1/0.1,
one strongly fragmented (S,S) and two partially fragmented (W,S) states; and (e) β = 1/0.05, one strongly fragmented (S,S)
and two weakly fragmented states (W,W).
ized much if only a single group populates a market, as
such an arrangement will still sustain a large number of
trades.
In Figure 10 we observe several differences compared
to the situation in Figure 9 for decisive traders, most
notably with regards to the number of solutions. Specif-
ically, as can just be discerned from Figure 10, on cross-
ing the fragmentation threshold four new states appear.
These states are also different in nature: they are par-
tially fragmented in the sense that one group of agents is
strongly fragmented and thus retains a bimodal distribu-
tion of attraction differences for r → 0 while the other is
either weakly fragmented or unfragmented. We have seen
a similar state in the systems with four agents although
there it was unstable because it reduced the number of
possible trades. In the large population limit, having one
fragmented and one unfragmented group of agents still
leaves many possibilities for trading, especially for inde-
cisive agents where roughly half of each group of agents
will probabilistically assume the role of buyer or seller in
each trading round. On the general grounds discussed
above, the appearance of the partially fragmented (U,S)
states is expected to proceed via (U,W) states, though
again the β-range where the latter appear is numerically
small.
When the intensity of choice β is increased beyond that
in Fig 10(a), the low-β solution transitions from (U,U) to
(W,W) (panel (b)) and eventually (S,S) (panel (d)), i.e.
both agent groups fragment first weakly then strongly.
Comparing the partially fragmented solutions in panels
(b) and (c) we see that they change from (U,S) to (W,S);
finally two of them merge with the uncoordinated (W,W)
state into an (S,S) state. The other two partially frag-
mented states eventually transition into (W,W) states;
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as in the case of decisive traders, these represent coordi-
nation of the agents at a single market.
B. (β, pB) Phase Diagram
We have observed both market consolidation and frag-
mentation when a population is faced with a choice of two
symmetric markets, depending on the different choice of
system parameters (pB, β). We next vary these parame-
ters systematically to construct a detailed phase diagram
and study the regions where one finds the various states
that we described above. The size of these regions then
also gives an indication of how typical the different sce-
narios are. We continue to focus on symmetric markets
with (θ1, θ−1) = (0.3, 0.7) but note that calculations for
other (symmetric) market settings give qualitatively sim-
ilar results. In Figure 11 we show the phase diagram in
the space of intensity of choice β and group preference for
buying pB ≡ p(1)B . This diagram is the large population
analogue of the diagram for four agents (N = 4) shown in
Fig. 5. There we had identified regions with states that
are unfragmented and indecisive (low β), unfragmented
and coordinated, fragmented, and partially fragmented.
Broadly these types of states persist in the large popula-
tion limit, but they have additional structure that makes
for a richer phase diagram.
To help visualize the structure of the phase diagram,
we show an additional version as an inset that has been
distorted to preserve the topology but make even small
regions in the phase diagram visible. Also, to avoid hav-
ing too many separate regions we do not distinguish in
the diagram between unfragmented (U) and weakly frag-
mented (W) states, which both have distributions of mar-
ket preferences that become unimodal for r → 0. We
label such states collectively V to separate them from
strongly fragmented states (S) with their bimodal mar-
ket preference distributions. Two vertical dashed lines
mark the two scenarios of decisive and indecisive traders
studied above (see Figs. 9 and 10).
We now look in more detail at the structure of Fig-
ure 11. Crossing any line in the phase diagram either
changes the number of population solutions or the na-
ture of the steady state for one or both agent groups.
We note that due to the symmetry of the system we con-
sider, many of the changes for the two groups happen
simultaneously. In the insert, regions of the parameter
space are laid out according to the number of solutions
– five solutions on the left and three on the right, with a
single solution in the small β region at the top.
The dark violet line in Figure 11 is the line where
the multiplicity of states changes from one to three or
five. Looking at the order parameter self-consistency
lines shows that this transition takes place via a pitch-
fork bifurcation in the former case, and two symmetric
saddle-node bifurcations in the latter. The dark violet
line is an analogue of the line shown in the same colour
in the phase diagram (Fig. 5) of the system with N = 4
players. The region of multiple solutions has grown for
large N , but the inverse critical intensity of choice 1/βc
is still an increasing function of pB.
As in Fig. 5, the pink line with circles in Figure 11
marks the appearance of a steady state where both
groups are strongly fragmented. We observe that the
critical intensity of choice where this happens diverges
(1/β → 0) as pB → 0.5, i.e. the region of strong frag-
mentation shrinks as the difference between the groups’
buying preferences diminishes. Further lines in the phase
diagram show where the solution multiplicity changes di-
rectly from three to five (yellow line), and where partial
fragmentation occurs (green and orange line) as individ-
ual solutions transition from (V,V) to (V,S). Note that
in the large population limit such partially fragmented
states appear only for populations with moderate prefer-
ences for buying, in contrast to the system with N = 4
agents (Fig. 5) where they exist for all pB.
We mark one further line (dashed pink) in the main
graph of Figure 11, showing the transition within the
small-β (V,V) solution from the unfragmented (U,U)
to the weakly fragmented (W,W) state. With this we
make an explicit connection to results reported previ-
ously (Figure 7 in [27]) where we investigated the ap-
pearance of (weak) fragmentation with increasing inten-
sity of choice. We note that for the system of our first
case study pB = 0.8 the thresholds for weak and strong
fragmentation almost overlap – the region of the weakly
fragmented indecisive state is very narrow for this choice
of parameters and in general for pB above ≈ 0.7, while it
becomes larger for indecisive traders. The pink circle on
the y-axis marks the end of the weak fragmentation line.
It turns out that this is the strong fragmentation thresh-
old of the homogeneous population with even preference
for buying and selling (pB = 0.5), with the change from
weak to strong fragmentation caused by the additional
symmetry between the two groups for this value of pB.
Interestingly, there are two distinct regions in the
phase diagram of Figure 11 where we observe three (V,V)
and two (V,S) states, i.e. three unfragmented and two
partially fragmented solutions. It turns out that in the
region at lower β (higher 1/β) the partially fragmented
solutions are coordinated, in so far as both groups of
agents have an overall preference for the same market.
For high β one has the opposite situation, and it is those
uncoordinated (V,S) solutions together with an unfrag-
mented (V,V) solution that then merge into a single (S,S)
state as pB is increased.
We note briefly that the various lines shown in Fig. 11
were detected by solution tracking, e.g. by carefully vary-
ing pB, β and tracking the number and type of solutions;
further details can be found in Appendix B. The tracking
approach is chosen as it is numerically faster and more
reliable than the finite r procedure we used in previous
figures, avoiding e.g. the numerical noise visible in the
two loci in Fig. 10. It is important to remember that the
results only provide information about the existence of
steady states, not their stability; the latter can be probed
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Figure 11. Types of steady states for two symmetric agent groups, shown in (β, pB) space. Crossing each of the lines changes
either the number or the type of steady states. The insert shows the distorted but topologically equivalent diagram to show the
phase diagram regions more clearly. The dark violet and yellow lines show the change in solution multiplicity, the pink solid
line with circles shows the strong fragmentation line, the pink dashed line shows the weak fragmentation of the uncoordinated
low-β solution, the orange and green lines show the partial fragmentation. Here V denotes a unimodal distribution of agents’
market preferences in the r → 0 limit, i.e., an unfragmented (U) or weakly fragmented (W) steady state and S denotes a
strongly fragmented steady state.
only using actual dynamics as discussed below. Fig. 11
also relates to fixed market biases so trends with changes
in these biases cannot be seen; we have checked, however,
that the overall structure of the phase diagram remains
intact as long as market biases are symmetric. Quan-
titative trends were explored in our previous work [27],
where we saw that the fragmentation region shrinks as
markets become increasingly different.
In summary, the diagram in Fig. 11 shows that for
systems with two symmetric markets and two groups
of traders with symmetric buying preferences both frag-
mented and coordinated (or consolidated) steady states
exist across a substantial range of values for the intensity
of choice β. Single market dominance happens when the
steady state is either unfragmented or weakly/partially
fragmented but coordinated: the majority of trades
then happen at a single market. On the other hand,
markets can coexist, receiving a roughly even share of
trades, when the steady state is strongly fragmentated
or weakly/partially fragmented but uncoordinated. In
the former case both markets are visited by both groups
while in the later case an effective market/group loyalty
appears. In the following sections we analyse these dif-
ferent steady states further, with regards to the average
population returns they produce and their stability in
simmulated systems with finite N and r.
C. Average Population Returns
The phase diagram in Figure 11 reveals a plethora of
possible steady states in the system of two markets and
a large population of traders, depending on the traders’
learning parameter β and their propensity to act as buy-
ers pB. We now investigate whether these steady states
induce differences in average population returns as we
saw in small systems, e.g. Figs 2 and 4. We look at the
average population return per trading round, where we
count also zero returns that arise from an order being
invalid or no trading partner being available.
In Figure 12, we show average population returns for
the two scenarios of decisive ((p
(1)
B , p
(2)
B ) = (0.8, 0.2),
panel (a)) and indecisive ((p
(1)
B , p
(2)
B ) = (0.55, 0.45), panel
(b)) traders. The β-dependences reflect the transitions
between solution types we saw earlier (in Figures 9, 10
and the phase diagram Fig. 11). The overall trends re-
semble those for finite N . First, we note that the return
of the uncoordinated, low β solution (marked in yellow in
Fig. 12) is the lowest among the alternatives once multi-
ple solutions exist. Second, the coordinated states (dark
violet) lead to the highest average return. Interestingly,
this is not influenced by the type of fragmentation, i.e.
it is true for both weakly fragmented and partially frag-
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Figure 12. Average population returns for different steady states in the r → 0 limit. The yellow line shows the low β steady
state representing uncoordinated population (dashed in the regime where it is no longer a bona fide steady state). The dashed
dark violet line marks the value of β where the multiplicity of solutions changes (see Fig. 11); at the dashed pink line strongly
fragmented steady states first appear. (a) Decisive population (p
(1)
B , p
(2)
B ) = (0.8, 0.2). The dark violet line shows the average
population return for a coordinated unfragmented or weakly fragmented steady state and the pink line similarly for a strongly
fragmented state. (b) Indecisive population (p
(1)
B , p
(2)
B ) = (0.55, 0.45). The dark violet line gives the average population returns
for partially fragmented steady states (coordinated on top, uncoordinated on bottom) and the pink line similarly for a strongly
fragmented state.
mented states as long as a majority of the population
develops a preference for a single market. By compari-
son, the strongly fragmented state (pink) always leads to
a lower average population return.
The differences in the returns achieved by popula-
tions of decisive and indecisive traders, respectively, are
driven mainly by the fact that indecisive groups can sus-
tain more trades without requiring the presence of other
groups at a market. This is particularly visible in the
higher population average return for low β; in this range
the decisive population suffers from the group-specific
market preferences that tend to separate traders towards
different markets and consequently result in a lower num-
ber of trades. Additionally, the continuation of the low
β solution is a viable steady state for a broader range of
intensities of choice for the indecisive population. The
dashed yellow line marks the region of β for which this
fixed point is no longer a genuine steady state, as the free
energy has multiple minima when evaluated at the order
parameters calculated for this fixed point. Along this line
the indecisive population return again does not drop as
far as it does in the case of a more decisive population.
In the right panel of Fig. 12 we note the occurence of
the saddle node biffurcation in the transition of the inde-
cisive population, with four new (V,S)-solutions (which
come in two pairs giving identical returns) emerging at
once. The top branch corresponds to the average pop-
ulation returns at the coordinated partially fragmented
states; for greater values of β (outside the range shown)
these states smoothly transition into weakly fragmented,
coordinated, states. The bottom branch relates to un-
coordinated partially fragmented states that merge into
the strongly fragmented (S,S) state for greater β.
Interestingly, the average population return in the high
β limit of the coordinated state also corresponds to the
average population return when all traders choose ran-
domly (i.e. β = 0). This is true because in both limits the
average number of agents trading at each market is equal.
Intriguingly, this means that when learning is introduced,
for low intensities of choice, an agent who takes decisions
based on their previous history may be worse off than an
agent who plays at random. This effect disappears again
only in the large β limit of the weakly fragmented state,
though note that in the latter case one group earns more
than the other. Returning to the strongly fragmented
state, despite indications that for a given β this is best
among the states that do not distinguish between groups
in the long run (see Fig 6 of [27]), in terms of average
population return this state is outperformed by random
traders (β = 0).
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D. Dynamics
We now ask what effect the existence of multiple steady
states, as predicted by theory for infinite populations, has
on the dynamics. We simulate the dynamics numerically,
necessarily for finite N and with learning rate r > 0,
i.e. for finite memory length 1/r. In previous work we
have already shown that the theory predicts the steady
state properties of finite populations quite well (see e.g.
Figure 4 in [27]). The role of r is more important as
this can shift phase boundaries [27]. (Conceptually, the
precise distinction for r → 0 between weakly and strongly
fragmented states is also lost for r > 0 and becomes a
crossover.)
Figure 13. Memory length dependence of phase boundaries.
The pink line (solid with circles and dotted) shows the frag-
mentation threshold, where at least one steady state is frag-
mented (weakly or strongly). The dark violet line (dark solid
and dashed) shows the boundary of the region where multi-
ple steady states exist. Solid lines represent indecisive traders
(p
(1)
B , p
(2)
B ) = (0.55, 0.45) and dashed lines decisive traders
(p
(1)
B , p
(2)
B ) = (0.8, 0.2). Multiple steady states exist for small
enough r, i.e., long enough memory 1/r. The market param-
eters are (θ1, θ−1) = (0.3, 0.7).
In Figure 13 we illustrate the r-dependence of two
key phase boundaries, for the two populations we have
mainly considered so far (decisive pB = 0.8 and indeci-
sive pB = 0.55). We note that the region of multiple
steady states shrinks with increasing r for both popu-
lations while the fragmentation line is only weakly r-
dependent. The lines are related to the lines of the same
color in the (β, pB) phase diagram in Fig. 11 and the
dashed grey lines marked in Fig. 11 correspond to the
r → 0 limit of the (r, β) phase diagram in Fig. 13.
Overall, Figure 13 tells us that we need to use rea-
sonably small r, certainly below 0.05 for pB = 0.8, to
see multiple steady states in numerical simulations. As
smaller r slow the dynamics, we choose in practice values
of r that are as large as possible while staying well within
the multiple states regime.
In Figure 14 we show numerical data for the actual
dynamics of a system of decisive tradners (p
(1)
B , p
(2)
B ) =
(0.8, 0.2) at our standard market parameters (θ1, θ2) =
(0.3, 0.7), taken from a single run for a population with
N = 2000 traders (see [37] for simulation details) us-
ing learning rate and inverse decision strength (r, 1/β) =
(0.05, 0.16). For these parameters the phase diagram
of Fig. 13 predicts the existence of three steady states,
two weakly fragmented states (with the majority of both
groups coordinated at the same market, m = −1 or
m = 1) and a strongly fragmented state (this state was
studied in [27], see Fig. 3 there; it is the unique steady
state for the larger r = 0.1 used in [27]). As a global
summary statistic of the shape of the attraction distri-
butions of the two groups of agents we use the Binder
cumulant [39]
B = 1− 〈∆
4〉P (∆)
3〈∆2〉2P (∆)
and plot this over time (see further discussion in [27, 37]).
Away from the strongly fragmented state the attraction
distributions of the two groups are not related by a sym-
metry so we plot their Binder cumulants separately.
Figure 14 shows that the system quickly reaches the
strongly fragmented state, with the Binder cumulants be-
ing close to the theoretically predicted value; the slight
deviation can be attributed to the finite population size.
The dynamics then branches off from the theoretical pre-
diction at t ≈ 50, showing that the strongly fragmented
state is, for finite N , only metastable. The departure
is led by one of the agent groups and reaches one of
the theoretically expected weakly fragmented states at
t ≈ 500, as shown in Figure 14 by the agreement both
of the relevant Binder cumulants and the full attraction
distributions (b).
We proceed in Fig. 15 (a) to analyse the life time
of the strongly fragmented steady state in more detail.
The figure displays Binder cumulant time series for dif-
ferent population sizes at the same learning parameters
(r, 1/β) = (0.05, 0.15) and shows that the lifetime in-
creases with system size (we have not analysed the N -
dependence in detail; in the range shown it is approx-
imately linear). We can compare this with the time
correlations of the attraction difference ∆ for individ-
ual agents: Fig 15 (b) graphs this correlation function,
measured from the point in time when the strongly frag-
mented state is first reached. One sees clearly that the
single agent correlation time is essentially independent
of N while the lifetime of the strongly fragmented state
grows significantly with system size N . The conclusion
is that strong fragmentation is a long-lived state of the
population for large N , within which single agents effec-
tively “equilibrate” by losing all memory of their initial
preferences.
In Figure 16 we move to the r-dependence of the life-
time of the strongly fragmented state, showing Binder cu-
mulants for a small system N = 200 for different r-values
at fixed 1/β = 0.15. For all values of r, rapid initial con-
vergence to the strongly fragmented state is observed.
Within this state the Binder cumulants depend weakly
on r as has been noted previously [27]), reflecting the
r-dependence of the attraction distributions. The life-
time of the strongly fragmented state, set by the decay
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Figure 14. Metastability of the strongly fragmented state and transition to the weakly fragmented state: dynamical evolution
of a system with N = 2000 agents using (r, 1/β) = (0.05, 0.16), with preferences for buying (p
(1)
B , p
(2)
B ) = (0.8, 0.2), and market
parameters (θ1, θ2) = (0.3, 0.7). (a) Evolution of Binder cumulants of the two attraction distributions of the two agent groups
[buyers (green) and sellers (orange)]. Dashed lines are theoretical predictions for the strongly fragmented steady state (dark
violet, equal for both groups) and weakly fragmented state (green and orange for the two groups). (b) Attraction distributions
predicted from theory for the weakly fragmented steady state (solid line) compared to simulation data at t = 500 (histogram).
of the Binder cumulant to lower values, increases with
r. This is consistent with the results of Fig. 13, which
showed that above some β-dependent threshold value for
r the strongly fragmented state is the only steady state
and thus must be stable, corresponding to an infinite life-
time. For the value β = 1/0.15 in Fig. 16, theory predicts
this threshold to be r ≈ 0.055. Numerically we see that
the strongly fragmented state has a finite lifetime up to
r = 0.07, presumably due to finite population effects for
the relatively small N = 200 used in the figure.
We find qualitatively the same features as above also
in numerical simulations of the dynamics of a system of
indecisive traders, with populations first reaching a long-
lived (for large N) strongly fragmented state and even-
tually decaying into a partially fragmented state. This is
the behaviour when such multiple steady states are pre-
dicted by our theory, i.e. for small r; for larger r (above
rc ≈ 0.02, see Fig. 13) strong fragmentation is the only
steady state. Quantitatively, we find that where strong
fragmentation is metastable its lifetimes are significantly
longer than for the decisive traders, exceeding our max-
imal simulation times of 106 trading rounds (t = 20000)
for the largest r < rc.
We comment finally on the role of initial conditions.
In the dynamical simulations shown so far we used for
these P (∆|pB) = δ(∆), corresponding to the reasonable
assumption that the agents have no initial preference for
either market. We also explored Gaussian initial distribu-
tions for the attraction differences, P (∆|pB) = N (µ, σ2).
Where there is only a single steady state we then find,
as expected, that this state is reached irrespective of the
chosen initial condition. On the other hand, where the
theory predicts multiple steady states, the initial condi-
tions do matter. We observe that the metastable strongly
fragmented state continues to be reached whenever the
mean initial attraction difference |µ| is small enough,
irrespective of the standard deviation σ. As |µ| is in-
creased we see that the dynamics “misses” the metastable
strongly fragmented state and rapidly moves to a final
weakly or partially fragmented state. This is consistent
with the intuition that these states break the symmetry
between markets, and hence are favoured when the popu-
lation already starts off with an overall initial preference
for one of the markets.
VI. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, our aim was to investigate the existence
of coordinated and fragmented steady states in a sys-
tem of agents choosing adaptively between two markets.
We focussed primarily on the long memory limit, where
the transition to fragmentation is sharp. We first stud-
ied two traders who learn how to coordinate at a market
and maximise their average return even though one of
them will necessarily earn less. Moving to a four player
system we observed fragmentation in addition to coor-
dination. Interestingly, we found that coordinated and
fragmented states lead to the same average population
return for high intensity of choice β, in spite of the pres-
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Figure 15. Lifetime of strongly fragmented state for different system sizes N . (a) Binder cumulant time series (averaged over
the two agent groups for compactness) along with the N →∞ theoretical prediction for the strongly fragmented state (dashed
line), showing an increase of lifetime with N . 1/β = 0.15 while the other parameters are as in Fig. 14. (b) Autocorrelation
function of single agent attraction differences C(t) = 〈(∆i(τ)−∆(τ))(∆i(τ + t)−∆(τ + t))〉: the single agent autocorrelation
time is essentially N independent.
Figure 16. Binder cumulant time series for different learning
rates r at the fixed intensity of choice 1/β = 0.15. All param-
eters are as in Fig. 14, except for the smaller population size
N = 200 and r as shown. The lifetime of the strongly frag-
mented state lifetime increases with r, eventually becoming
infinite when this state is the only steady-state solution.
ence of two different types of agents (buyers and sellers).
In the coordinated state one of the agent types will al-
ways earn less, while in the fragmented state both types
have the same average, but one agent from each group
is less satisfied. Thus at the fragmented state, average
returns do not discriminate between types of agents.
We then introduced a general method for determin-
ing the type and number of steady states in the limit of
large populations with long memory. This can be done in
our setup with only a single order parameter per market.
After a preliminary analysis for exogenously determined
order parameters, we saw that in the general case a self-
consistency criterion determines the order parameters in
the steady state. Analysing a quantity analogous to a
free energy then allows one to say whether a population
(or one of its groups) is fragmented and whether this
fragmentation is strong or weak.
Already for small system sizes we noticed that the
agents’ preference for buying, pB, is an important system
parameter. Not only does it influence the critical inten-
sity of choice β on pB for the onset of fragmentation, but
for N ≥ 4 it also qualitatively affects the nature of the
steady states. This remains true also for the N → ∞
limit, where we find a rich variety of steady states in the
(β, pB) diagram, in spite of the simplified nature of our
models for markets and traders. These include: market
coexistence - where both markets attract both types of
traders (S,S), and where market/trader specialisation oc-
curred (W,W) (uncoordinated weakly fragmented state
for moderately indecisive traders); single market dom-
inance (W,W) (coordinated weakly fragmented states);
market indifference (U,U) (e.g. for low β); general vs.
specialised markets (e.g. (U,S), where a single market
attracts both groups of agents while the other can be
viewed as specializing towards only one group). Interest-
ingly, all these different steady states arise without im-
posing any heterogeneity onto the agents (in contrast to
assumptions elsewhere [23]) and fragmentation is the pre-
ferred state even when the markets have identical prop-
erties (contrary to views expressed in [2, 18]).
To interpret our results for the prevalence of fragmen-
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tation more broadly we can draw on the work of Cheung
et al. [40], who use evidence from Behavioural Game The-
ory to suggest that values of β are consistent across games
but increase in more informative environments. The au-
thors also argue that a parameter closely analogous to r
increases with the trustworthiness of information in the
system. Bearing in mind the results shown in Fig. 13,
where for large r and large β the only steady state is the
fragmented one, this suggests that more informative envi-
ronments, or ones where information is more trustworthy
because e.g. of stability over long timescales, might nat-
urally lead to fragmented states. The prevalence of the
strongly fragmented state is clear also from Figure 11,
which shows that this state exists for all populations with
groups symmetrically biased towards buying and selling,
respectively.
One of the non-trivial predictions of our theory is
the existence of partiallay fragmented states, where one
group of agents (e.g. those who have a preference for
buying) fragments while the other (where agents prefer
to sell) does not. We saw that the region in the phase
diagram where such states appear increases with N for
indecisive traders and shrinks for decisive traders (com-
pare Fig. 5 for N = 4 and Fig. 11 for N →∞).
We studied also the average population returns
achieved by agents in the various steady states. For
large populations we saw that the coordinated weakly
fragmented steady state leads to the highest population
average returns, even though one agent group earns less
in that state. We also noticed that such steady states,
which essentially represent coordination at a single mar-
ket when r → 0, lead to the same average payoff for
large β as for random agents (β = 0). This is because
coordination at a single market, just like random market
choice, leads to the same number of buyers and sellers
at a single market and thus the same number of success-
ful trades and average returns. Interestingly, this shows
that weak learning (finite β) leads to lower returns, e.g.
not choosing the strictly best trading venue (in terms of
returns) can be worse for an agent than random guess-
ing. This behaviour is rather similar to the “J-curve”
effect studied in [41, 42] where, in the context of trading
agents with different information levels, moderately in-
formed agents earn less from higher informed agents but
also from uninformed, randomly trading, agents.
Finally we investigated, by means of numerical simu-
lations, how the theoretically predicted steady states ap-
pear in the dynamics of finite agent populations. If the
agent start as “blank canvasses” (without initial market
preference), we found that the adaptation process always
leads to the strongly fragmented state first. This state
is metastable, with a lifetime that grows large with pop-
ulation size, and the system eventually settles into one
of the weakly fragmented states. This remains true even
if there is scatter in the agents’ initial preferences, while
a systematic initial bias towards one of the markets can
cause the dynamics to “miss out” the metastable strongly
fragmented state. To put this result into more intuitive
terms, two markets that enter into competition to at-
tract on average indifferent traders will always exhibit a
period of coexistence in a strongly fragmented state (and
if r > rc this coexistence will last indefinitely), whereas
if the population is not indifferent initially then a market
monopoly will arise much more quickly.
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Appendix A: Details of the Fokker-Planck
description
In this appendix we provide some of the explicit ex-
pressions appearing in the Fokker-Planck description of
our market choice model. As per definitions of bid and
ask distributions and score assignments, defined in Trad-
ing strategies of section II, the return distributions for an
agent choosing a market m and an order type B or S are:
P (S|m,B) = QBmTBm 1
QBmσb
√
2pi
exp
(
− (S − (µb − pim))
2
2σ2b
)
θ(S) + δ(S)(1−QBmTBm),
P (S|m,S) = QSmTSm︸ ︷︷ ︸
agent trades
1
QSmσa
√
2pi
exp
(
− (S − (pim − µa))
2
2σ2a
)
θ(S)︸ ︷︷ ︸
non-negative return
+δ(S) (1−QSmTSm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
agent does not trade
. (A1)
(Note that in statements of these distributions in pre-
vious publications [27], µa and µb were omitted due a
typographical error.) When agents have fixed buying
preferences pB, their return distribution is then depen-
dent only on the chosen market m:
P (S|m) = pBP (S|m,B) + (1− pB)P (S|m,S).
The probabilities that an order is valid, Qγ , are given by
QBm =
1
σb
√
2pi
∫ ∞
pim
db exp
(
− (b− µb)
2
2σ2b
)
,
QSm =
1
σa
√
2pi
∫ pim
−∞
da exp
(
− (a− µa)
2
2σ2a
)
.
and can be expressed in terms of error functions [37].
The transition kernel between two states ∆ and ∆′ of
an agent with buying preference pB is
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Figure 17. Drift M1(∆) (top), diffusion M2(∆) (middle) and free energy f(∆) (bottom) functions for a subgroup with pref-
erence for buying pB = 0.8. Function plots illustrate three qualitatively different conditions for the following pairs of market
order parameters: (a) (D1, D−1) = (1, 1), unfragmented region; (b) (D1, D−1) = (1.1, 1), weakly fragmented region; and (c)
(D1, D−1) = (1.15, 1), strongly fragmented region. Market biases are set to the standard values (θ1, θ−1) = (0.7, 0.3). All
functions are evaluated at the intensity of choice β = 1/0.265.
K(∆′|∆, pB) =
∫
dS
1∑
m=−1
[
pBP (S|m,B) + (1− pB)P (S|m,S)
]
P (m|∆)δ(∆′ −mrS − (1− r)∆). (A2)
The resulting drift and diffusion terms for small r are
discussed in detail in [37], here (Fig. 17) we provide
plots corresponding to Eqs. (12,13), evaluated at three
different sets of market order parameters for ilustration.
We consider the value β = 1/0.265 for the intensity of
choice, in order to match Fig. 9 (c). The three sets
of market order parameters all lie on a horizontal line
(D−1 = −1), while D1 is changed so that the order pa-
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rameters lie in the unfragmented, the weakly fragmented
or the strongly fragmented region respectively. Plots in
the left panels (a) ilustrate market conditions leading to
an unfragmented distribution – there is a unique solution
of M1(∆|pB, Tγ) = 0, corresponding to the unique free
energy minimum (calculated from Eq. 15 and shown in
the third row of the figure). Both are marked by a circle.
The middle panels (b) ilustrate the weakly fragmented
case, where there are three zeros of the drift term (two
stable fixed points and one unstable one), corresponding
to two minima of the free energy; as the minima are at
different height the resulting (steady state) distribution
of ∆ will become concentrated around the lowest mini-
mum for r → 0 as discussed in the main text. Finally, the
case shown in the panels (c) has two equal minima of the
free energy and thus represents a strongly fragmented
scenario. Note that the diffusion term M2(∆) is in all
three cases of order unity and does not affect the num-
ber of free energy minima; it only makes a quantitative
contribution to the free energy and hence to P (∆|pB, Tγ).
Appendix B: Algorithmic remarks
The method of finding all steady state solutions by
identifying loci of self-consistent market order parame-
ters is the best way to exhaust market order parameter
space and thus to find all the solutions for the finite r. By
identifying the domains where these solutions lie we can
also fully characterize the solution at nonzero r, obtain-
ing information about the limit r → 0 by extrapolation.
However, this method is numerically demanding as for
every point in order parameter space we need to find a
steady state distribution (its normalisation usually takes
most of the processing time) and recalculate the corre-
sponding order parameters. Checking what corrections
arise for r → 0 takes additional time. We describe nu-
merically less demanding alternatives below.
Population with homogeneous market preferences.
We have seen that depending on system parameters the
attraction distribution for a group of agents can be uni-
modal in the r → 0 limit (“U” and “W” states). These
states represent a population where the market prefer-
ences within the group are homogeneous. This realisation
offers a straightforward way to find all the states of this
type for any system parameter. The demand-to-supply
order parameters simplify to
Dm =
p
(1)
B
∫
d∆σβ(m∆)P (∆|p(1)B ) + p(2)B
∫
d∆σβ(m∆)P (∆|p(2)B )
(1− p(1)B )
∫
d∆σβ(m∆)P (∆|p(1)B ) + (1− p(2)B )
∫
d∆σβ(m∆)P (∆|p(2)B )
=
p
(1)
B σβ(m∆
(1)) + p
(2)
B σβ(m∆
(2))
(1− p(1)B )σβ(m∆(1)) + (1− p(2)B )σβ(m∆(2))
, (B1)
where in the second row we have used 〈σβ(∆)〉 =
σβ(〈∆〉), a relation that is exact in the r → 0 limit where
the steady state distribution is a delta distribution cen-
tred at ∆(g). To identify these peak positions we find the
zeros of the first jump moment M1 as defined in Eq. (12),
taking into account the dependence of Dm on the at-
traction difference ∆(g) in each group. This means that
when searching for a steady state in which both groups of
traders have homogeneous market preferences, we need
to solve the peak position equations for the two groups
simultaneously:
M
(1)
1 (∆
(1)|p(1)B , Dm(∆(1),∆(2))) = 0 ,
M
(2)
1 (∆
(2)|p(2)B , Dm(∆(1),∆(2))) = 0 . (B2)
Every solution (∆(1)∗,∆(2)∗) found in this way needs to
be checked for consistency with the initial assumption of
homogeneous market preferences, ı.e. the market order
parameters corresponding to every solution pair need to
belong to the unfragmented or weakly fragmented solu-
tion domain. This is done by calculating the corresond-
ing order parameters Dm from Eq. (B1) and finding the
“free energy” corresponding to these order parameters.
If the global free energy minimum is centred at ∆(g)∗
the solution is consistent with our initial assumption and
we have found a (homogeneous) population steady state.
Depending on the signs of ∆∗ we classify such steady
states further as either coordinated for ∆(1)∗∆(2)∗ > 0
or uncoordinated for ∆(1)∗∆(2)∗ < 0. For any finite in-
tensity of choice β, a single agent can of course choose
another market even if the state is categorized as coor-
dinated at market 1, but the categorization is exact for
the β →∞ limit.
In the second case study (pB = 0.55), the continua-
tion of the low β fixed point is a solution we can consis-
tently find by this method for a wide range of intensities
of choice, much wider than when the groups have more
pronounced buy/sell preferences. Crossing the dark vio-
let line in phase diagram (Fig. 11), the new fixed points
that arise turn out to be all inconsistent with the homo-
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geneous population assumption until very high intensities
of choice. This is why we need to employ different tech-
niques to find the other solutions presented in Figure 10.
Only when the intensity of choice is increased further do
partially fragmented states cease to exist, and solutions
consistent with the homogeneous population assumption
return.
Strongly co-fragmented state (S,S). To find if these
states exist we apply a procedure based on a Maxwell
construction argument outlined in Section IV A and
in [37] for a population consisting of a single group. For
each group we define a locus in the space of order pa-
rameters (D1, D2) for which the strong fragmentation
condition Eq.˜(8) is satisfied. If there is an intersection
(D∗1 , D
∗
2) between the two loci there are market demand-
to-supply ratios in which both groups favour a strongly
fragmented state. We finally need to confirm that the
two order parameters can be created if only the two frag-
mented groups trade on the markets. If we assume the
strongly fragmented distributions are of the form
P (∆|p(g)B ) = ω(g)δ(∆−∆(g)1 ) + (1− ω(g))δ(∆−∆(g)2 )
then the corresponding order parameters are:
Dm =
NBm
NSm
Dm =
p
(1)
B
[
ω(1)σβ(m∆
(1)
1 ) + (1− ω(1))σβ(m∆(1)2 )
]
+ p
(2)
B
[
ω(2)σβ(m∆
(2)
1 ) + (1− ω(2))σβ(m∆(2)2 )
]
(1− p(1)B )
[
ω(1)σβ(m∆
(1)
1 ) + (1− ω(1))σβ(m∆(1)2 )
]
+ (1− p(2)B )
[
ω(2)σβ(m∆
(2)
1 ) + (1− ω(2))σβ(m∆(2)2 )
] (B3)
If there are weights ω(g) ∈ [0, 1] corresponding to the in-
tersection point (D∗1 , D
∗
2) then the strongly fragmented
state exists. These states leave both markets equally ac-
tive and as we showed in the discussion in Sec V they
entail benefits for the population as a whole, not favour-
ing any of the symmetric groups.
Partially fragmented states. Finally, we outline a pro-
cedure to find a population steady state that is a com-
bination of a bimodal (S) state in one group and a uni-
modal (U or W) state in the other, for r → 0. A start-
ing point for this search can be obtained by solving the
homogeneous population equations (B2). When one of
the groups is consistent with the homogeneous popula-
tion assumption while the other is not, we can investi-
gate whether the strongly fragmented solution for this
other population exists. To find these states, we assume
that the group that is inconsistent with a given homo-
geneous population solution is in the fragmented state.
Thus possible order parameters for this state are on the
locus defined by the Maxwell construction. For every
pair (D1, D2) from the fragmented state locus we inves-
tigate the “free energy” of the second group (whether it is
unfragmented or weakly fragmented). We find the peak
position and represent the attraction distribution as a
unimodal distribution centred at the (global) free energy
minimum. We only need to examine whether by peak
weight redistribution of the strongly fragmented group
we can retrieve the initial order parameters (D1, D2).
When this is possible, the partially fragmented state ex-
ists. In the example shown in Figure 10, due to mild
buy/sell preferences, when one of the groups is frag-
mented there are two unfragmented options for the sec-
ond group, corresponding to specialisation to either of
the two markets.
